Adds the host-level egress firewall recommended by the upstream DeerFlow team's "run in a VLAN" guidance, adapted to a Fritzbox-only home network where LAN VLANs are not available. - docker/docker-compose.override.yaml: pins the upstream deer-flow Docker network to a stable Linux bridge name br-deerflow so the firewall can address it without guessing Docker's auto-generated br-<hash>. Used as a -f overlay on top of the upstream compose file. - scripts/deerflow-firewall.sh: idempotent up/down/status wrapper that installs DOCKER-USER iptables rules. Allowlist for 10.67.67.1 (Searx) and 10.67.67.2 (XTTS/Whisper/Ollama-local), hard block for 192.168.3.0/24 (home LAN), 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12. Stateful return rule keeps inbound LAN access to published ports working. - scripts/deerflow-firewall.nix: NixOS module snippet defining a systemd unit ordered After=docker.service so the rules survive dockerd restarts and follow its lifecycle. Copy into configuration.nix and nixos-rebuild switch. - HARDENING.md: new section 2.7 "Network isolation (egress firewall)" with allow/block tables, bring-up steps, and smoke-test commands. Guarantees: rules match on -i br-deerflow, so if the bridge does not exist, the rules are no-ops and do not affect any other container (paperclip, telebrowser, openclaw-gateway, ...). Stopping the container leaves the rules in place but inert; stopping the systemd unit removes them.
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DeerFlow Hardening Notes
This repository is a hardened deployment of bytedance/deer-flow with the only goal of preventing prompt-injection attacks via the agent's web access surface.
The upstream tree lives in deer-flow/ and is checked in directly (no
submodule, no nested git). All hardening changes are kept inside that tree
so that python -m deerflow.community.searx.tools resolves out of the box
once deer-flow/backend/packages/harness is on PYTHONPATH.
This document is a defense-in-depth audit trail. If you change any of the files listed here, please update this document in the same commit.
1. Threat model
Prompt-injection via untrusted web content. An attacker controls the body of an HTML page (or a search-result snippet) and tries to make the model:
- Treat externally fetched text as system instructions (delimiter confusion).
- Smuggle hidden tokens via invisible Unicode (zero-width spaces, BOM, PUA, tag characters).
- Inject executable HTML (
<script>,<iframe>,<form>, ...) that the model would summarise verbatim.
The hardening below is a port of the OpenClaw approach (searx-scripts/,
fetch-scripts/) to DeerFlow's adapter contract.
2. What was changed
2.1 New: deerflow.security
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/security/
| File | Purpose |
|---|---|
__init__.py |
Public re-exports |
content_delimiter.py |
Wraps untrusted content in <<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>> ... <<<END_EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>> so the LLM has a semantic boundary between system instructions and external data |
html_cleaner.py |
SecureTextExtractor strips script, style, noscript, header, footer, nav, aside, iframe, object, embed, form |
sanitizer.py |
PromptInjectionSanitizer: 8 layers — invisible chars, control chars, symbols (So/Sk), NFC normalize, PUA, tag chars, horizontal-whitespace collapse (newlines/tabs preserved), length cap |
2.2 New: deerflow.community.searx
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/searx/tools.py
LangChain @tool exports:
web_search_tool(query, max_results=10)— calls a private SearX instance, sanitizes title + content, wraps results in security delimitersweb_fetch_tool(url, max_chars=10000)— fetches URL, runsextract_secure_textthensanitizer.sanitize, wraps resultimage_search_tool(query, max_results=5)— SearXcategories=images, sanitized title/url/thumbnail, wrapped
Reads its config from get_app_config().get_tool_config(<name>).model_extra:
searx_url, max_results, max_chars.
2.3 Disabled: native community web tools
Every legacy provider's tools.py was replaced with a hard-fail stub that
raises NativeWebToolDisabledError at module import time. Importing
the module aborts with a clear message pointing at the searx replacement,
so a misconfigured tool.use: path in config.yaml fails loud, not silent.
| Provider | Status | Reason |
|---|---|---|
community/ddg_search/tools.py |
stub | unhardened DuckDuckGo HTML scrape |
community/tavily/tools.py |
stub | external API, no sanitization |
community/exa/tools.py |
stub | external API, no sanitization |
community/firecrawl/tools.py |
stub | external API, no sanitization |
community/jina_ai/tools.py |
stub | unhardened Jina Reader |
community/jina_ai/jina_client.py |
stub | back-door client, also disabled |
community/infoquest/tools.py |
stub | external API, no sanitization |
community/infoquest/infoquest_client.py |
stub | back-door client, also disabled |
community/image_search/tools.py |
stub | unhardened DDG image fallback |
Central reject helper: community/_disabled_native.py —
reject_native_provider(name) raises NativeWebToolDisabledError.
2.4 Quarantined tests
Tests that expected the native modules to be importable are moved to
deer-flow/backend/tests/_disabled_native/. A conftest.py in that
directory sets collect_ignore_glob = ["*.py"] so pytest skips them
without erroring.
| Test | Reason |
|---|---|
test_exa_tools.py |
imports deerflow.community.exa.tools |
test_firecrawl_tools.py |
imports deerflow.community.firecrawl.tools |
test_jina_client.py |
imports deerflow.community.jina_ai.jina_client |
test_infoquest_client.py |
imports deerflow.community.infoquest.infoquest_client |
test_doctor.py and test_setup_wizard.py reference the native paths
only as strings in test configs (not as imports), so they continue to
run unchanged.
2.5 Sanitizer bug fix
PromptInjectionSanitizer.sanitize() Layer 7 used to do
re.sub(r'\s+', ' ', text) which collapsed \n and \t into single
spaces — destroying list/table structure from web pages. Replaced with
horizontal-whitespace-only collapse plus \n{3,} -> \n\n. Verified by
test_security_sanitizer.py::test_preserves_newlines_and_tabs.
2.6 Hardened runtime config
config.yaml (top-level, not deer-flow/config.example.yaml) is the
runtime config and references only the searx-backed tools:
tools:
- name: web_search
group: web
use: deerflow.community.searx.tools:web_search_tool
searx_url: http://10.67.67.1:8888
max_results: 10
- name: web_fetch
group: web
use: deerflow.community.searx.tools:web_fetch_tool
max_chars: 10000
- name: image_search
group: web
use: deerflow.community.searx.tools:image_search_tool
max_results: 5
The guardrail layer is intentionally not used as the primary block:
DeerFlow guardrails see only tool.name (e.g. web_search), and both the
hardened and the native version export the same name. The real block is
the import-time stub above.
2.7 Network isolation (egress firewall)
The DeerFlow team recommends running the agent in a dedicated VLAN. Our Fritzbox cannot do LAN VLANs, so instead we put the container behind an egress firewall on the Docker host. The container can reach the Internet plus a small whitelist of Wireguard hosts (Searx, local model servers), but cannot scan or attack any device on the home LAN. Inbound traffic from the LAN to the container's published ports is unaffected because the rules are stateful.
Allow (egress from container):
| Destination | Purpose |
|---|---|
1.0.0.0/8 ... 223.0.0.0/8 (public Internet) |
Ollama Cloud, search backends |
10.67.67.1 |
Searx (Wireguard) |
10.67.67.2 |
XTTS / Whisper / Ollama-local (Wireguard) |
Block (egress from container):
| Destination | Reason |
|---|---|
192.168.3.0/24 |
home LAN — no lateral movement |
10.0.0.0/8 (except whitelisted /32) |
other Wireguard subnets, RFC1918 |
172.16.0.0/12 |
other Docker bridges |
Implementation:
| File | Role |
|---|---|
docker/docker-compose.override.yaml |
Pins the upstream deer-flow Docker network to a stable Linux bridge name br-deerflow, so the firewall can address it without guessing Docker's auto-generated br-<hash>. Used as a -f overlay on top of deer-flow/docker/docker-compose.yaml. |
scripts/deerflow-firewall.sh |
Idempotent up/down/status wrapper that installs the iptables rules in the DOCKER-USER chain. Inserted in reverse order so the final chain order is: stateful return, allow Searx, allow Ollama-local, block LAN, block /8, block /12. |
scripts/deerflow-firewall.nix |
NixOS module snippet defining systemd.services.deerflow-firewall. Ordered After=docker.service, Requires=docker.service, PartOf=docker.service so the rules survive dockerd restarts and follow its lifecycle. Copy into configuration.nix and nixos-rebuild switch. |
Important guarantees:
- The rules match on
-i br-deerflow. If the bridge does not exist (e.g. DeerFlow has never been started), the rules are no-ops and do not affect any other container (paperclip, telebrowser, openclaw-gateway, ...). They activate automatically the momentdocker compose ... up -dcreates the bridge. - Stopping or removing the DeerFlow container leaves the rules in place but inert. Stopping the systemd unit removes them.
- The script is idempotent:
upwill never duplicate a rule,downremoves all copies.
Bring up:
cd /home/data/deerflow-factory
docker compose \
-f deer-flow/docker/docker-compose.yaml \
-f docker/docker-compose.override.yaml \
up -d
# Then either run the script directly:
sudo scripts/deerflow-firewall.sh up
# ...or, on NixOS, copy scripts/deerflow-firewall.nix into configuration.nix
# and:
sudo nixos-rebuild switch
systemctl status deerflow-firewall
Smoke tests (run from inside the container, e.g. docker exec -it <id> sh):
# allowed
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 5 http://10.67.67.1:8888/ # Searx -> 200
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 5 https://api.cloudflare.com/ # Internet -> 200/4xx
# blocked (should fail with "no route" / "host prohibited" / timeout)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 5 http://192.168.3.1/ # FAIL
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" --max-time 5 http://10.67.67.16/ # FAIL (blocked by 10/8 reject; .16 is not whitelisted)
3. Verification
All checks below assume PYTHONPATH=deer-flow/backend/packages/harness.
3.1 Hardened modules import
python3 -c "
from deerflow.security.content_delimiter import wrap_untrusted_content
from deerflow.security.sanitizer import sanitizer
from deerflow.security.html_cleaner import extract_secure_text
import importlib.util
assert importlib.util.find_spec('deerflow.community.searx.tools') is not None
print('OK')
"
3.2 Native modules fail closed
python3 -c "
for prov in ['ddg_search','tavily','exa','firecrawl','jina_ai','infoquest','image_search']:
try:
__import__(f'deerflow.community.{prov}.tools')
raise SystemExit(f'FAIL: {prov} imported')
except RuntimeError as e:
assert 'disabled in this hardened DeerFlow build' in str(e)
print('OK — all native providers blocked')
"
3.3 Security tests
PYTHONPATH=deer-flow/backend/packages/harness pytest \
backend/tests/test_security_sanitizer.py \
backend/tests/test_security_html_cleaner.py -q
Expected: 8 passed.
4. Adding a new web tool
- Implement it in
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/<name>/tools.py. - Always sanitize external strings via
deerflow.security.sanitizer. - Always wrap the response with
wrap_untrusted_content(). - For HTML input, use
extract_secure_text()first. - Add a test to
backend/tests/that asserts the security delimiters are present in the tool output. - Update this document.
5. Re-enabling a native provider (don't)
If you really must:
- Replace the stub in
community/<provider>/tools.pywith a hardened wrapper (sanitize → delimiter, just like searx). - Move the matching test out of
tests/_disabled_native/. - Update this document and explain the threat-model change in your commit message.
6. Files touched (audit trail)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/security/__init__.py (new)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/security/content_delimiter.py (new)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/security/html_cleaner.py (new)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/security/sanitizer.py (new, with newline-preserving fix)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/searx/__init__.py (new)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/searx/tools.py (new)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/_disabled_native.py (new)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/ddg_search/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/tavily/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/exa/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/firecrawl/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/jina_ai/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/jina_ai/jina_client.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/infoquest/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/infoquest/infoquest_client.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/image_search/tools.py (replaced with stub)
deer-flow/backend/tests/_disabled_native/conftest.py (new — collect_ignore_glob)
deer-flow/backend/tests/_disabled_native/test_exa_tools.py (moved)
deer-flow/backend/tests/_disabled_native/test_firecrawl_tools.py (moved)
deer-flow/backend/tests/_disabled_native/test_jina_client.py (moved)
deer-flow/backend/tests/_disabled_native/test_infoquest_client.py (moved)
backend/packages/harness/deerflow/security/ (factory overlay, kept in sync)
backend/packages/harness/deerflow/community/searx/ (factory overlay, kept in sync)
backend/tests/test_security_sanitizer.py (factory tests)
backend/tests/test_security_html_cleaner.py (factory tests)
backend/tests/test_searx_tools.py (factory tests)
config.yaml (hardened runtime config, references only searx tools)
.env.example (template, no secrets)
HARDENING.md (this file)
docker/docker-compose.override.yaml (named bridge br-deerflow)
scripts/deerflow-firewall.sh (egress firewall up/down/status)
scripts/deerflow-firewall.nix (NixOS systemd unit snippet)