Vendored deer-flow upstream (bytedance/deer-flow) plus prompt-injection hardening: - New deerflow.security package: content_delimiter, html_cleaner, sanitizer (8 layers — invisible chars, control chars, symbols, NFC, PUA, tag chars, horizontal whitespace collapse with newline/tab preservation, length cap) - New deerflow.community.searx package: web_search, web_fetch, image_search backed by a private SearX instance, every external string sanitized and wrapped in <<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>> delimiters - All native community web providers (ddg_search, tavily, exa, firecrawl, jina_ai, infoquest, image_search) replaced with hard-fail stubs that raise NativeWebToolDisabledError at import time, so a misconfigured tool.use path fails loud rather than silently falling back to unsanitized output - Native client back-doors (jina_client.py, infoquest_client.py) stubbed too - Native-tool tests quarantined under tests/_disabled_native/ (collect_ignore_glob via local conftest.py) - Sanitizer Layer 7 fix: only collapse horizontal whitespace, preserve newlines and tabs so list/table structure survives - Hardened runtime config.yaml references only the searx-backed tools - Factory overlay (backend/) kept in sync with deer-flow tree as a reference / source See HARDENING.md for the full audit trail and verification steps.
202 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
202 lines
6.5 KiB
Python
"""Shared upload management logic.
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Pure business logic — no FastAPI/HTTP dependencies.
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Both Gateway and Client delegate to these functions.
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"""
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import os
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import re
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from pathlib import Path
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from urllib.parse import quote
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from deerflow.config.paths import VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX, get_paths
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class PathTraversalError(ValueError):
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"""Raised when a path escapes its allowed base directory."""
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# thread_id must be alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, or dots only.
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_SAFE_THREAD_ID = re.compile(r"^[a-zA-Z0-9._-]+$")
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def validate_thread_id(thread_id: str) -> None:
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"""Reject thread IDs containing characters unsafe for filesystem paths.
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Raises:
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ValueError: If thread_id is empty or contains unsafe characters.
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"""
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if not thread_id or not _SAFE_THREAD_ID.match(thread_id):
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raise ValueError(f"Invalid thread_id: {thread_id!r}")
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def get_uploads_dir(thread_id: str) -> Path:
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"""Return the uploads directory path for a thread (no side effects)."""
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validate_thread_id(thread_id)
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return get_paths().sandbox_uploads_dir(thread_id)
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def ensure_uploads_dir(thread_id: str) -> Path:
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"""Return the uploads directory for a thread, creating it if needed."""
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base = get_uploads_dir(thread_id)
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base.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
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return base
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def normalize_filename(filename: str) -> str:
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"""Sanitize a filename by extracting its basename.
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Strips any directory components and rejects traversal patterns.
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Args:
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filename: Raw filename from user input (may contain path components).
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Returns:
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Safe filename (basename only).
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Raises:
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ValueError: If filename is empty or resolves to a traversal pattern.
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"""
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if not filename:
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raise ValueError("Filename is empty")
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safe = Path(filename).name
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if not safe or safe in {".", ".."}:
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raise ValueError(f"Filename is unsafe: {filename!r}")
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# Reject backslashes — on Linux Path.name keeps them as literal chars,
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# but they indicate a Windows-style path that should be stripped or rejected.
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if "\\" in safe:
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raise ValueError(f"Filename contains backslash: {filename!r}")
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if len(safe.encode("utf-8")) > 255:
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raise ValueError(f"Filename too long: {len(safe)} chars")
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return safe
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def claim_unique_filename(name: str, seen: set[str]) -> str:
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"""Generate a unique filename by appending ``_N`` suffix on collision.
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Automatically adds the returned name to *seen* so callers don't need to.
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Args:
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name: Candidate filename.
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seen: Set of filenames already claimed (mutated in place).
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Returns:
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A filename not present in *seen* (already added to *seen*).
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"""
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if name not in seen:
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seen.add(name)
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return name
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stem, suffix = Path(name).stem, Path(name).suffix
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counter = 1
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candidate = f"{stem}_{counter}{suffix}"
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while candidate in seen:
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counter += 1
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candidate = f"{stem}_{counter}{suffix}"
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seen.add(candidate)
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return candidate
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def validate_path_traversal(path: Path, base: Path) -> None:
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"""Verify that *path* is inside *base*.
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Raises:
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PathTraversalError: If a path traversal is detected.
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"""
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try:
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path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
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except ValueError:
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raise PathTraversalError("Path traversal detected") from None
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def list_files_in_dir(directory: Path) -> dict:
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"""List files (not directories) in *directory*.
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Args:
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directory: Directory to scan.
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Returns:
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Dict with "files" list (sorted by name) and "count".
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Each file entry has ``size`` as *int* (bytes). Call
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:func:`enrich_file_listing` to stringify sizes and add
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virtual / artifact URLs.
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"""
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if not directory.is_dir():
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return {"files": [], "count": 0}
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files = []
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with os.scandir(directory) as entries:
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for entry in sorted(entries, key=lambda e: e.name):
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if not entry.is_file(follow_symlinks=False):
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continue
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st = entry.stat(follow_symlinks=False)
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files.append(
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{
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"filename": entry.name,
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"size": st.st_size,
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"path": entry.path,
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"extension": Path(entry.name).suffix,
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"modified": st.st_mtime,
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}
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)
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return {"files": files, "count": len(files)}
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def delete_file_safe(base_dir: Path, filename: str, *, convertible_extensions: set[str] | None = None) -> dict:
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"""Delete a file inside *base_dir* after path-traversal validation.
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If *convertible_extensions* is provided and the file's extension matches,
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the companion ``.md`` file is also removed (if it exists).
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Args:
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base_dir: Directory containing the file.
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filename: Name of file to delete.
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convertible_extensions: Lowercase extensions (e.g. ``{".pdf", ".docx"}``)
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whose companion markdown should be cleaned up.
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Returns:
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Dict with success and message.
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Raises:
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FileNotFoundError: If the file does not exist.
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PathTraversalError: If path traversal is detected.
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"""
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file_path = (base_dir / filename).resolve()
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validate_path_traversal(file_path, base_dir)
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if not file_path.is_file():
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raise FileNotFoundError(f"File not found: {filename}")
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file_path.unlink()
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# Clean up companion markdown generated during upload conversion.
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if convertible_extensions and file_path.suffix.lower() in convertible_extensions:
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file_path.with_suffix(".md").unlink(missing_ok=True)
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return {"success": True, "message": f"Deleted {filename}"}
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def upload_artifact_url(thread_id: str, filename: str) -> str:
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"""Build the artifact URL for a file in a thread's uploads directory.
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*filename* is percent-encoded so that spaces, ``#``, ``?`` etc. are safe.
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"""
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return f"/api/threads/{thread_id}/artifacts{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/{quote(filename, safe='')}"
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def upload_virtual_path(filename: str) -> str:
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"""Build the virtual path for a file in the uploads directory."""
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return f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/{filename}"
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def enrich_file_listing(result: dict, thread_id: str) -> dict:
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"""Add virtual paths, artifact URLs, and stringify sizes on a listing result.
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Mutates *result* in place and returns it for convenience.
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"""
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for f in result["files"]:
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filename = f["filename"]
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f["size"] = str(f["size"])
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f["virtual_path"] = upload_virtual_path(filename)
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f["artifact_url"] = upload_artifact_url(thread_id, filename)
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return result
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