Agents in this build are text-only researchers. Image, audio, video,
and binary content has no role in the pipeline and only widens the
attack surface (server-side image fetches, exfiltration via rendered
img tags, etc). The cleanest answer is to never load it in the first
place rather than maintain a domain allowlist that nobody can keep
up to date.
- web_fetch_tool now uses httpx.AsyncClient.stream and inspects the
Content-Type header BEFORE the body is read into memory. Only
text/*, application/json, application/xml, application/xhtml+xml,
application/ld+json, application/atom+xml, application/rss+xml are
accepted; everything else (image/*, audio/*, video/*, octet-stream,
pdf, font, missing header, ...) is refused with a wrap_untrusted
error reply. The body bytes never enter the process for refused
responses. Read budget is bounded to ~4x max_chars regardless.
- image_search_tool removed from deerflow.community.searx.tools
(both the deer-flow runtime tree and the factory overlay). The
function is gone, not stubbed — any tool.use referencing it will
raise AttributeError at tool-loading time.
- config.yaml: image_search tool entry removed; the example
allowed_tools list updated to drop image_search.
- HARDENING.md: new section 2.8 explains the policy and the frontend
caveat (the LLM can still emit  markdown which the user's
browser would render — that requires a separate frontend patch
that is not yet implemented). Section 3.4 adds a verification
snippet for the policy. The web_fetch entry in section 2.2 is
updated to mention the streaming Content-Type gate.
Both source trees stay in sync.
DATA
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