Vendored deer-flow upstream (bytedance/deer-flow) plus prompt-injection hardening: - New deerflow.security package: content_delimiter, html_cleaner, sanitizer (8 layers — invisible chars, control chars, symbols, NFC, PUA, tag chars, horizontal whitespace collapse with newline/tab preservation, length cap) - New deerflow.community.searx package: web_search, web_fetch, image_search backed by a private SearX instance, every external string sanitized and wrapped in <<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>> delimiters - All native community web providers (ddg_search, tavily, exa, firecrawl, jina_ai, infoquest, image_search) replaced with hard-fail stubs that raise NativeWebToolDisabledError at import time, so a misconfigured tool.use path fails loud rather than silently falling back to unsanitized output - Native client back-doors (jina_client.py, infoquest_client.py) stubbed too - Native-tool tests quarantined under tests/_disabled_native/ (collect_ignore_glob via local conftest.py) - Sanitizer Layer 7 fix: only collapse horizontal whitespace, preserve newlines and tabs so list/table structure survives - Hardened runtime config.yaml references only the searx-backed tools - Factory overlay (backend/) kept in sync with deer-flow tree as a reference / source See HARDENING.md for the full audit trail and verification steps.
1057 lines
44 KiB
Python
1057 lines
44 KiB
Python
import threading
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from pathlib import Path
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from types import SimpleNamespace
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import pytest
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from deerflow.sandbox.tools import (
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VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX,
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_apply_cwd_prefix,
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_get_custom_mount_for_path,
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_get_custom_mounts,
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_is_acp_workspace_path,
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_is_custom_mount_path,
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_is_skills_path,
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_reject_path_traversal,
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_resolve_acp_workspace_path,
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_resolve_and_validate_user_data_path,
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_resolve_skills_path,
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bash_tool,
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mask_local_paths_in_output,
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replace_virtual_path,
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replace_virtual_paths_in_command,
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str_replace_tool,
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validate_local_bash_command_paths,
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validate_local_tool_path,
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write_file_tool,
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)
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_THREAD_DATA = {
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"workspace_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace",
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"uploads_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/uploads",
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"outputs_path": "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs",
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}
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# ---------- replace_virtual_path ----------
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def test_replace_virtual_path_maps_virtual_root_and_subpaths() -> None:
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assert Path(replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/a.txt", _THREAD_DATA)).as_posix() == "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/a.txt"
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assert Path(replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data", _THREAD_DATA)).as_posix() == "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data"
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def test_replace_virtual_path_preserves_trailing_slash() -> None:
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"""Trailing slash must survive virtual-to-actual path replacement.
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Regression: '/mnt/user-data/workspace/' was previously returned without
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the trailing slash, causing string concatenations like
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output_dir + 'file.txt' to produce a missing-separator path.
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"""
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result = replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/", _THREAD_DATA)
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assert result.endswith("/"), f"Expected trailing slash, got: {result!r}"
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assert result == "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/"
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def test_replace_virtual_path_preserves_trailing_slash_windows_style() -> None:
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"""Trailing slash must be preserved as backslash when actual_base is Windows-style.
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If actual_base uses backslash separators, appending '/' would produce a
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mixed-separator path. The separator must match the style of actual_base.
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"""
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win_thread_data = {
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"workspace_path": r"C:\deer-flow\threads\t1\user-data\workspace",
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"uploads_path": r"C:\deer-flow\threads\t1\user-data\uploads",
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"outputs_path": r"C:\deer-flow\threads\t1\user-data\outputs",
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}
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result = replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/", win_thread_data)
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assert result.endswith("\\"), f"Expected trailing backslash for Windows path, got: {result!r}"
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assert "/" not in result, f"Mixed separators in Windows path: {result!r}"
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def test_replace_virtual_path_preserves_windows_style_for_nested_subdir_trailing_slash() -> None:
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"""Nested Windows-style subdirectories must keep backslashes throughout."""
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win_thread_data = {
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"workspace_path": r"C:\deer-flow\threads\t1\user-data\workspace",
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"uploads_path": r"C:\deer-flow\threads\t1\user-data\uploads",
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"outputs_path": r"C:\deer-flow\threads\t1\user-data\outputs",
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}
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result = replace_virtual_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/subdir/", win_thread_data)
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assert result == "C:\\deer-flow\\threads\\t1\\user-data\\workspace\\subdir\\"
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assert "/" not in result, f"Mixed separators in Windows path: {result!r}"
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def test_replace_virtual_paths_in_command_preserves_trailing_slash() -> None:
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"""Trailing slash on a virtual path inside a command must be preserved."""
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cmd = """python -c "output_dir = '/mnt/user-data/workspace/'; print(output_dir + 'some_file.txt')\""""
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result = replace_virtual_paths_in_command(cmd, _THREAD_DATA)
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assert "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/" in result, f"Trailing slash lost in: {result!r}"
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# ---------- mask_local_paths_in_output ----------
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def test_mask_local_paths_in_output_hides_host_paths() -> None:
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output = "Created: /tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/result.txt"
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masked = mask_local_paths_in_output(output, _THREAD_DATA)
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assert "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data" not in masked
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assert "/mnt/user-data/workspace/result.txt" in masked
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def test_mask_local_paths_in_output_hides_skills_host_paths() -> None:
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"""Skills host paths in bash output should be masked to virtual paths."""
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with (
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"),
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_host_path", return_value="/home/user/deer-flow/skills"),
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):
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output = "Reading: /home/user/deer-flow/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md"
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masked = mask_local_paths_in_output(output, _THREAD_DATA)
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assert "/home/user/deer-flow/skills" not in masked
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assert "/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md" in masked
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# ---------- _reject_path_traversal ----------
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def test_reject_path_traversal_blocks_dotdot() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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_reject_path_traversal("/mnt/user-data/workspace/../../etc/passwd")
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def test_reject_path_traversal_blocks_dotdot_at_start() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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_reject_path_traversal("../etc/passwd")
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def test_reject_path_traversal_blocks_backslash_dotdot() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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_reject_path_traversal("/mnt/user-data/workspace\\..\\..\\etc\\passwd")
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def test_reject_path_traversal_allows_normal_paths() -> None:
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# Should not raise
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_reject_path_traversal("/mnt/user-data/workspace/file.txt")
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_reject_path_traversal("/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md")
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_reject_path_traversal("/mnt/user-data/workspace/sub/dir/file.py")
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# ---------- validate_local_tool_path ----------
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_rejects_non_virtual_path() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Only paths under"):
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validate_local_tool_path("/Users/someone/config.yaml", _THREAD_DATA)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_rejects_non_virtual_path_mentions_configured_mounts() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="configured mount paths"):
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validate_local_tool_path("/Users/someone/config.yaml", _THREAD_DATA)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_prioritizes_user_data_before_custom_mounts() -> None:
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from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import VolumeMountConfig
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mounts = [
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VolumeMountConfig(host_path="/tmp/host-user-data", container_path=VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX, read_only=False),
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]
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with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=mounts):
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/file.txt", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=True)
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with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=mounts):
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/../../etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=True)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_rejects_bare_virtual_root() -> None:
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"""The bare /mnt/user-data root without trailing slash is not a valid sub-path."""
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Only paths under"):
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validate_local_tool_path(VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX, _THREAD_DATA)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_allows_user_data_paths() -> None:
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# Should not raise — user-data paths are always allowed
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/file.txt", _THREAD_DATA)
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/uploads/doc.pdf", _THREAD_DATA)
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/outputs/result.csv", _THREAD_DATA)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_allows_user_data_write() -> None:
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# read_only=False (default) should still work for user-data paths
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/file.txt", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=False)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_rejects_traversal_in_user_data() -> None:
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"""Path traversal via .. in user-data paths must be rejected."""
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/../../etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_rejects_traversal_in_skills() -> None:
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"""Path traversal via .. in skills paths must be rejected."""
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with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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validate_local_tool_path("/mnt/skills/../../etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=True)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_rejects_none_thread_data() -> None:
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"""Missing thread_data should raise SandboxRuntimeError."""
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from deerflow.sandbox.exceptions import SandboxRuntimeError
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with pytest.raises(SandboxRuntimeError):
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validate_local_tool_path(f"{VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX}/workspace/file.txt", None)
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# ---------- _resolve_skills_path ----------
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def test_resolve_skills_path_resolves_correctly() -> None:
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"""Skills virtual path should resolve to host path."""
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with (
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"),
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_host_path", return_value="/home/user/deer-flow/skills"),
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):
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resolved = _resolve_skills_path("/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md")
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assert resolved == "/home/user/deer-flow/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md"
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def test_resolve_skills_path_resolves_root() -> None:
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"""Skills container root should resolve to host skills directory."""
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with (
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"),
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_host_path", return_value="/home/user/deer-flow/skills"),
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):
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resolved = _resolve_skills_path("/mnt/skills")
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assert resolved == "/home/user/deer-flow/skills"
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def test_resolve_skills_path_raises_when_not_configured() -> None:
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"""Should raise FileNotFoundError when skills directory is not available."""
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with (
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"),
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_host_path", return_value=None),
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):
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with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError, match="Skills directory not available"):
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_resolve_skills_path("/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md")
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# ---------- _resolve_and_validate_user_data_path ----------
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def test_resolve_and_validate_user_data_path_resolves_correctly(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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"""Resolved path should land inside the correct thread directory."""
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workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
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workspace.mkdir()
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thread_data = {
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"workspace_path": str(workspace),
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"uploads_path": str(tmp_path / "uploads"),
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"outputs_path": str(tmp_path / "outputs"),
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}
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resolved = _resolve_and_validate_user_data_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/hello.txt", thread_data)
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assert resolved == str(workspace / "hello.txt")
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def test_resolve_and_validate_user_data_path_blocks_traversal(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
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"""Even after resolution, path must stay within allowed roots."""
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workspace = tmp_path / "workspace"
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workspace.mkdir()
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thread_data = {
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"workspace_path": str(workspace),
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"uploads_path": str(tmp_path / "uploads"),
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"outputs_path": str(tmp_path / "outputs"),
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}
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# This path resolves outside the allowed roots
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
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_resolve_and_validate_user_data_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace/../../../etc/passwd", thread_data)
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# ---------- replace_virtual_paths_in_command ----------
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def test_replace_virtual_paths_in_command_replaces_skills_paths() -> None:
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"""Skills virtual paths in commands should be resolved to host paths."""
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with (
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"),
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_host_path", return_value="/home/user/deer-flow/skills"),
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):
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cmd = "cat /mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md"
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result = replace_virtual_paths_in_command(cmd, _THREAD_DATA)
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assert "/mnt/skills" not in result
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assert "/home/user/deer-flow/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md" in result
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def test_replace_virtual_paths_in_command_replaces_both() -> None:
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"""Both user-data and skills paths should be replaced in the same command."""
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with (
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"),
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patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_host_path", return_value="/home/user/skills"),
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):
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cmd = "cat /mnt/skills/public/SKILL.md > /mnt/user-data/workspace/out.txt"
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result = replace_virtual_paths_in_command(cmd, _THREAD_DATA)
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assert "/mnt/skills" not in result
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assert "/mnt/user-data" not in result
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assert "/home/user/skills/public/SKILL.md" in result
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assert "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace/out.txt" in result
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# ---------- validate_local_bash_command_paths ----------
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def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_host_paths() -> None:
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Unsafe absolute paths"):
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validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA)
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def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_https_urls() -> None:
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"""URLs like https://github.com/... must not be flagged as unsafe absolute paths."""
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validate_local_bash_command_paths(
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"cd /mnt/user-data/workspace && git clone https://github.com/CherryHQ/cherry-studio.git",
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_THREAD_DATA,
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)
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def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_http_urls() -> None:
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"""HTTP URLs must not be flagged as unsafe absolute paths."""
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validate_local_bash_command_paths(
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"curl http://example.com/file.tar.gz -o /mnt/user-data/workspace/file.tar.gz",
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_THREAD_DATA,
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)
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def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_virtual_and_system_paths() -> None:
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validate_local_bash_command_paths(
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"/bin/echo ok > /mnt/user-data/workspace/out.txt && cat /dev/null",
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_THREAD_DATA,
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)
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def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_traversal_in_user_data() -> None:
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"""Bash commands with traversal in user-data paths should be blocked."""
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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validate_local_bash_command_paths(
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"cat /mnt/user-data/workspace/../../etc/passwd",
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_THREAD_DATA,
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)
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def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_traversal_in_skills() -> None:
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"""Bash commands with traversal in skills paths should be blocked."""
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with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
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with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
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validate_local_bash_command_paths(
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"cat /mnt/skills/../../etc/passwd",
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_THREAD_DATA,
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)
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def test_bash_tool_rejects_host_bash_when_local_sandbox_default(monkeypatch) -> None:
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runtime = SimpleNamespace(
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state={"sandbox": {"sandbox_id": "local"}, "thread_data": _THREAD_DATA.copy()},
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context={"thread_id": "thread-1"},
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_sandbox_initialized",
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lambda runtime: SimpleNamespace(execute_command=lambda command: pytest.fail("host bash should not execute")),
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.is_host_bash_allowed", lambda: False)
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result = bash_tool.func(
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runtime=runtime,
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description="run command",
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command="/bin/echo hello",
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)
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assert "Host bash execution is disabled" in result
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# ---------- Skills path tests ----------
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|
|
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def test_is_skills_path_recognises_default_prefix() -> None:
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with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
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assert _is_skills_path("/mnt/skills") is True
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assert _is_skills_path("/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md") is True
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assert _is_skills_path("/mnt/skills-extra/foo") is False
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assert _is_skills_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace") is False
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|
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_allows_skills_read_only() -> None:
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"""read_file / ls should be able to access /mnt/skills paths."""
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with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
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# Should not raise
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validate_local_tool_path(
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"/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md",
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_THREAD_DATA,
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read_only=True,
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)
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def test_validate_local_tool_path_blocks_skills_write() -> None:
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"""write_file / str_replace must NOT write to skills paths."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Write access to skills path is not allowed"):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path(
|
|
"/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
read_only=False,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_skills_path() -> None:
|
|
"""bash commands referencing /mnt/skills should be allowed."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"cat /mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_urls() -> None:
|
|
"""URLs in bash commands should not be mistaken for absolute paths (issue #1385)."""
|
|
# HTTPS URLs
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"curl -X POST https://example.com/api/v1/risk/check",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
# HTTP URLs
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"curl http://localhost:8080/health",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
# URLs with query strings
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"curl https://api.example.com/v2/search?q=test",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
# FTP URLs
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"curl ftp://ftp.example.com/pub/file.tar.gz",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
# URL mixed with valid virtual path
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"curl https://example.com/data -o /mnt/user-data/workspace/data.json",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_file_urls() -> None:
|
|
"""file:// URLs should be treated as unsafe and blocked."""
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("curl file:///etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_file_urls_case_insensitive() -> None:
|
|
"""file:// URL detection should be case-insensitive."""
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("curl FILE:///etc/shadow", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_file_urls_mixed_with_valid() -> None:
|
|
"""file:// URLs should be blocked even when mixed with valid paths."""
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"curl file:///etc/passwd -o /mnt/user-data/workspace/out.txt",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_still_blocks_other_paths() -> None:
|
|
"""Paths outside virtual and system prefixes must still be blocked."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/mnt/skills"):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Unsafe absolute paths"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /etc/shadow", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_skills_custom_container_path() -> None:
|
|
"""Skills with a custom container_path in config should also work."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_skills_container_path", return_value="/custom/skills"):
|
|
# Should not raise
|
|
validate_local_tool_path(
|
|
"/custom/skills/public/my-skill/SKILL.md",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
read_only=True,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
# The default /mnt/skills should not match since container path is /custom/skills
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Only paths under"):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path(
|
|
"/mnt/skills/public/bootstrap/SKILL.md",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
read_only=True,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------- ACP workspace path tests ----------
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_acp_workspace_path_recognises_prefix() -> None:
|
|
assert _is_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace") is True
|
|
assert _is_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace/hello.py") is True
|
|
assert _is_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace-extra/foo") is False
|
|
assert _is_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/user-data/workspace") is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_allows_acp_workspace_read_only() -> None:
|
|
"""read_file / ls should be able to access /mnt/acp-workspace paths."""
|
|
validate_local_tool_path(
|
|
"/mnt/acp-workspace/hello_world.py",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
read_only=True,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_blocks_acp_workspace_write() -> None:
|
|
"""write_file / str_replace must NOT write to ACP workspace paths."""
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Write access to ACP workspace is not allowed"):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path(
|
|
"/mnt/acp-workspace/hello_world.py",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
read_only=False,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_acp_workspace() -> None:
|
|
"""bash commands referencing /mnt/acp-workspace should be allowed."""
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"cp /mnt/acp-workspace/hello_world.py /mnt/user-data/outputs/hello_world.py",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_traversal_in_acp_workspace() -> None:
|
|
"""Bash commands with traversal in ACP workspace paths should be blocked."""
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths(
|
|
"cat /mnt/acp-workspace/../../etc/passwd",
|
|
_THREAD_DATA,
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_acp_workspace_path_resolves_correctly(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
|
|
"""ACP workspace virtual path should resolve to host path."""
|
|
acp_dir = tmp_path / "acp-workspace"
|
|
acp_dir.mkdir()
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_acp_workspace_host_path", return_value=str(acp_dir)):
|
|
resolved = _resolve_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace/hello.py")
|
|
assert resolved == str(acp_dir / "hello.py")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_acp_workspace_path_resolves_root(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
|
|
"""ACP workspace root should resolve to host directory."""
|
|
acp_dir = tmp_path / "acp-workspace"
|
|
acp_dir.mkdir()
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_acp_workspace_host_path", return_value=str(acp_dir)):
|
|
resolved = _resolve_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace")
|
|
assert resolved == str(acp_dir)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_acp_workspace_path_raises_when_not_available() -> None:
|
|
"""Should raise FileNotFoundError when ACP workspace does not exist."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_acp_workspace_host_path", return_value=None):
|
|
with pytest.raises(FileNotFoundError, match="ACP workspace directory not available"):
|
|
_resolve_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace/hello.py")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_resolve_acp_workspace_path_blocks_traversal(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
|
|
"""Path traversal in ACP workspace paths must be rejected."""
|
|
acp_dir = tmp_path / "acp-workspace"
|
|
acp_dir.mkdir()
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_acp_workspace_host_path", return_value=str(acp_dir)):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
|
|
_resolve_acp_workspace_path("/mnt/acp-workspace/../../etc/passwd")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_replace_virtual_paths_in_command_replaces_acp_workspace() -> None:
|
|
"""ACP workspace virtual paths in commands should be resolved to host paths."""
|
|
acp_host = "/home/user/.deer-flow/acp-workspace"
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_acp_workspace_host_path", return_value=acp_host):
|
|
cmd = "cp /mnt/acp-workspace/hello.py /mnt/user-data/outputs/hello.py"
|
|
result = replace_virtual_paths_in_command(cmd, _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
assert "/mnt/acp-workspace" not in result
|
|
assert f"{acp_host}/hello.py" in result
|
|
assert "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/outputs/hello.py" in result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_mask_local_paths_in_output_hides_acp_workspace_host_paths() -> None:
|
|
"""ACP workspace host paths in bash output should be masked to virtual paths."""
|
|
acp_host = "/home/user/.deer-flow/acp-workspace"
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_acp_workspace_host_path", return_value=acp_host):
|
|
output = f"Copied: {acp_host}/hello.py"
|
|
masked = mask_local_paths_in_output(output, _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
assert acp_host not in masked
|
|
assert "/mnt/acp-workspace/hello.py" in masked
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------- _apply_cwd_prefix ----------
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_cwd_prefix_prepends_workspace() -> None:
|
|
"""Command is prefixed with cd <workspace> && when workspace_path is set."""
|
|
result = _apply_cwd_prefix("ls -la", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
assert result.startswith("cd ")
|
|
assert "ls -la" in result
|
|
assert "/tmp/deer-flow/threads/t1/user-data/workspace" in result
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_cwd_prefix_no_thread_data() -> None:
|
|
"""Command is returned unchanged when thread_data is None."""
|
|
assert _apply_cwd_prefix("ls -la", None) == "ls -la"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_cwd_prefix_missing_workspace_path() -> None:
|
|
"""Command is returned unchanged when workspace_path is absent from thread_data."""
|
|
assert _apply_cwd_prefix("ls -la", {}) == "ls -la"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_apply_cwd_prefix_quotes_path_with_spaces() -> None:
|
|
"""Workspace path containing spaces is properly shell-quoted."""
|
|
thread_data = {**_THREAD_DATA, "workspace_path": "/tmp/my workspace/t1"}
|
|
result = _apply_cwd_prefix("echo hello", thread_data)
|
|
assert result == "cd '/tmp/my workspace/t1' && echo hello"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_mcp_filesystem_paths() -> None:
|
|
"""Bash commands referencing MCP filesystem server paths should be allowed."""
|
|
from deerflow.config.extensions_config import ExtensionsConfig, McpServerConfig
|
|
|
|
mock_config = ExtensionsConfig(
|
|
mcp_servers={
|
|
"filesystem": McpServerConfig(
|
|
enabled=True,
|
|
command="npx",
|
|
args=["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/mnt/d/workspace"],
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
with patch("deerflow.config.extensions_config.get_extensions_config", return_value=mock_config):
|
|
# Should not raise - MCP filesystem paths are allowed
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("ls /mnt/d/workspace", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /mnt/d/workspace/subdir/file.txt", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
# Path traversal should still be blocked
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /mnt/d/workspace/../../etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
# Disabled servers should not expose paths
|
|
disabled_config = ExtensionsConfig(
|
|
mcp_servers={
|
|
"filesystem": McpServerConfig(
|
|
enabled=False,
|
|
command="npx",
|
|
args=["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/mnt/d/workspace"],
|
|
)
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
with patch("deerflow.config.extensions_config.get_extensions_config", return_value=disabled_config):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Unsafe absolute paths"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("ls /mnt/d/workspace", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
# ---------- Custom mount path tests ----------
|
|
|
|
|
|
def _mock_custom_mounts():
|
|
"""Create mock VolumeMountConfig objects for testing."""
|
|
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import VolumeMountConfig
|
|
|
|
return [
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path="/home/user/code-read", container_path="/mnt/code-read", read_only=True),
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path="/home/user/data", container_path="/mnt/data", read_only=False),
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_is_custom_mount_path_recognises_configured_mounts() -> None:
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
assert _is_custom_mount_path("/mnt/code-read") is True
|
|
assert _is_custom_mount_path("/mnt/code-read/src/main.py") is True
|
|
assert _is_custom_mount_path("/mnt/data") is True
|
|
assert _is_custom_mount_path("/mnt/data/file.txt") is True
|
|
assert _is_custom_mount_path("/mnt/code-read-extra/foo") is False
|
|
assert _is_custom_mount_path("/mnt/other") is False
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_custom_mount_for_path_returns_longest_prefix() -> None:
|
|
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import VolumeMountConfig
|
|
|
|
mounts = [
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path="/var/mnt", container_path="/mnt", read_only=False),
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path="/home/user/code", container_path="/mnt/code", read_only=True),
|
|
]
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=mounts):
|
|
mount = _get_custom_mount_for_path("/mnt/code/file.py")
|
|
assert mount is not None
|
|
assert mount.container_path == "/mnt/code"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_allows_custom_mount_read() -> None:
|
|
"""read_file / ls should be able to access custom mount paths."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path("/mnt/code-read/src/main.py", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=True)
|
|
validate_local_tool_path("/mnt/data/file.txt", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_blocks_read_only_mount_write() -> None:
|
|
"""write_file / str_replace must NOT write to read-only custom mounts."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Write access to read-only mount is not allowed"):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path("/mnt/code-read/src/main.py", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=False)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_allows_writable_mount_write() -> None:
|
|
"""write_file / str_replace should succeed on writable custom mounts."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path("/mnt/data/file.txt", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=False)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_tool_path_blocks_traversal_in_custom_mount() -> None:
|
|
"""Path traversal via .. in custom mount paths must be rejected."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
|
|
validate_local_tool_path("/mnt/code-read/../../etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA, read_only=True)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_allows_custom_mount() -> None:
|
|
"""bash commands referencing custom mount paths should be allowed."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /mnt/code-read/src/main.py", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("ls /mnt/data", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_blocks_traversal_in_custom_mount() -> None:
|
|
"""Bash commands with traversal in custom mount paths should be blocked."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="path traversal"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /mnt/code-read/../../etc/passwd", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_validate_local_bash_command_paths_still_blocks_non_mount_paths() -> None:
|
|
"""Paths not matching any custom mount should still be blocked."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
with pytest.raises(PermissionError, match="Unsafe absolute paths"):
|
|
validate_local_bash_command_paths("cat /etc/shadow", _THREAD_DATA)
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_custom_mounts_caching(monkeypatch, tmp_path) -> None:
|
|
"""_get_custom_mounts should cache after first successful load."""
|
|
# Clear any existing cache
|
|
if hasattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached"):
|
|
monkeypatch.delattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached")
|
|
|
|
# Use real directories so host_path.exists() filtering passes
|
|
dir_a = tmp_path / "code-read"
|
|
dir_a.mkdir()
|
|
dir_b = tmp_path / "data"
|
|
dir_b.mkdir()
|
|
|
|
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import SandboxConfig, VolumeMountConfig
|
|
|
|
mounts = [
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path=str(dir_a), container_path="/mnt/code-read", read_only=True),
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path=str(dir_b), container_path="/mnt/data", read_only=False),
|
|
]
|
|
mock_sandbox = SandboxConfig(use="deerflow.sandbox.local:LocalSandboxProvider", mounts=mounts)
|
|
mock_config = SimpleNamespace(sandbox=mock_sandbox)
|
|
|
|
with patch("deerflow.config.get_app_config", return_value=mock_config):
|
|
result = _get_custom_mounts()
|
|
assert len(result) == 2
|
|
|
|
# After caching, should return cached value even without mock
|
|
assert hasattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached")
|
|
assert len(_get_custom_mounts()) == 2
|
|
|
|
# Cleanup
|
|
monkeypatch.delattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_custom_mounts_filters_nonexistent_host_path(monkeypatch, tmp_path) -> None:
|
|
"""_get_custom_mounts should only return mounts whose host_path exists."""
|
|
if hasattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached"):
|
|
monkeypatch.delattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached")
|
|
|
|
from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import SandboxConfig, VolumeMountConfig
|
|
|
|
existing_dir = tmp_path / "existing"
|
|
existing_dir.mkdir()
|
|
|
|
mounts = [
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path=str(existing_dir), container_path="/mnt/existing", read_only=True),
|
|
VolumeMountConfig(host_path="/nonexistent/path/12345", container_path="/mnt/ghost", read_only=False),
|
|
]
|
|
mock_sandbox = SandboxConfig(use="deerflow.sandbox.local:LocalSandboxProvider", mounts=mounts)
|
|
mock_config = SimpleNamespace(sandbox=mock_sandbox)
|
|
|
|
with patch("deerflow.config.get_app_config", return_value=mock_config):
|
|
result = _get_custom_mounts()
|
|
assert len(result) == 1
|
|
assert result[0].container_path == "/mnt/existing"
|
|
|
|
# Cleanup
|
|
monkeypatch.delattr(_get_custom_mounts, "_cached")
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_get_custom_mount_for_path_boundary_no_false_prefix_match() -> None:
|
|
"""_get_custom_mount_for_path must not match /mnt/code-read-extra for /mnt/code-read."""
|
|
with patch("deerflow.sandbox.tools._get_custom_mounts", return_value=_mock_custom_mounts()):
|
|
mount = _get_custom_mount_for_path("/mnt/code-read-extra/foo")
|
|
assert mount is None
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_str_replace_parallel_updates_should_preserve_both_edits(monkeypatch) -> None:
|
|
class SharedSandbox:
|
|
def __init__(self) -> None:
|
|
self.content = "alpha\nbeta\n"
|
|
self._active_reads = 0
|
|
self._state_lock = threading.Lock()
|
|
self._overlap_detected = threading.Event()
|
|
|
|
def read_file(self, path: str) -> str:
|
|
with self._state_lock:
|
|
self._active_reads += 1
|
|
snapshot = self.content
|
|
if self._active_reads == 2:
|
|
self._overlap_detected.set()
|
|
|
|
self._overlap_detected.wait(0.05)
|
|
|
|
with self._state_lock:
|
|
self._active_reads -= 1
|
|
|
|
return snapshot
|
|
|
|
def write_file(self, path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> None:
|
|
self.content = content
|
|
|
|
sandbox = SharedSandbox()
|
|
runtimes = [
|
|
SimpleNamespace(state={}, context={"thread_id": "thread-1"}, config={}),
|
|
SimpleNamespace(state={}, context={"thread_id": "thread-1"}, config={}),
|
|
]
|
|
failures: list[BaseException] = []
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_sandbox_initialized", lambda runtime: sandbox)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_thread_directories_exist", lambda runtime: None)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.is_local_sandbox", lambda runtime: False)
|
|
|
|
def worker(runtime: SimpleNamespace, old_str: str, new_str: str) -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
result = str_replace_tool.func(
|
|
runtime=runtime,
|
|
description="并发替换同一文件",
|
|
path="/mnt/user-data/workspace/shared.txt",
|
|
old_str=old_str,
|
|
new_str=new_str,
|
|
)
|
|
assert result == "OK"
|
|
except BaseException as exc: # pragma: no cover - failure is asserted below
|
|
failures.append(exc)
|
|
|
|
threads = [
|
|
threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(runtimes[0], "alpha", "ALPHA")),
|
|
threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(runtimes[1], "beta", "BETA")),
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
for thread in threads:
|
|
thread.start()
|
|
for thread in threads:
|
|
thread.join()
|
|
|
|
assert failures == []
|
|
assert "ALPHA" in sandbox.content
|
|
assert "BETA" in sandbox.content
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_str_replace_parallel_updates_in_isolated_sandboxes_should_not_share_path_lock(monkeypatch) -> None:
|
|
class IsolatedSandbox:
|
|
def __init__(self, sandbox_id: str, shared_state: dict[str, object]) -> None:
|
|
self.id = sandbox_id
|
|
self.content = "alpha\nbeta\n"
|
|
self._shared_state = shared_state
|
|
|
|
def read_file(self, path: str) -> str:
|
|
state_lock = self._shared_state["state_lock"]
|
|
with state_lock:
|
|
active_reads = self._shared_state["active_reads"]
|
|
self._shared_state["active_reads"] = active_reads + 1
|
|
snapshot = self.content
|
|
if self._shared_state["active_reads"] == 2:
|
|
overlap_detected = self._shared_state["overlap_detected"]
|
|
overlap_detected.set()
|
|
|
|
overlap_detected = self._shared_state["overlap_detected"]
|
|
overlap_detected.wait(0.05)
|
|
|
|
with state_lock:
|
|
active_reads = self._shared_state["active_reads"]
|
|
self._shared_state["active_reads"] = active_reads - 1
|
|
|
|
return snapshot
|
|
|
|
def write_file(self, path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> None:
|
|
self.content = content
|
|
|
|
shared_state: dict[str, object] = {
|
|
"active_reads": 0,
|
|
"state_lock": threading.Lock(),
|
|
"overlap_detected": threading.Event(),
|
|
}
|
|
sandboxes = {
|
|
"sandbox-a": IsolatedSandbox("sandbox-a", shared_state),
|
|
"sandbox-b": IsolatedSandbox("sandbox-b", shared_state),
|
|
}
|
|
runtimes = [
|
|
SimpleNamespace(state={}, context={"thread_id": "thread-1", "sandbox_key": "sandbox-a"}, config={}),
|
|
SimpleNamespace(state={}, context={"thread_id": "thread-2", "sandbox_key": "sandbox-b"}, config={}),
|
|
]
|
|
failures: list[BaseException] = []
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr(
|
|
"deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_sandbox_initialized",
|
|
lambda runtime: sandboxes[runtime.context["sandbox_key"]],
|
|
)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_thread_directories_exist", lambda runtime: None)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.is_local_sandbox", lambda runtime: False)
|
|
|
|
def worker(runtime: SimpleNamespace, old_str: str, new_str: str) -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
result = str_replace_tool.func(
|
|
runtime=runtime,
|
|
description="隔离 sandbox 并发替换同一路径",
|
|
path="/mnt/user-data/workspace/shared.txt",
|
|
old_str=old_str,
|
|
new_str=new_str,
|
|
)
|
|
assert result == "OK"
|
|
except BaseException as exc: # pragma: no cover - failure is asserted below
|
|
failures.append(exc)
|
|
|
|
threads = [
|
|
threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(runtimes[0], "alpha", "ALPHA")),
|
|
threading.Thread(target=worker, args=(runtimes[1], "beta", "BETA")),
|
|
]
|
|
|
|
for thread in threads:
|
|
thread.start()
|
|
for thread in threads:
|
|
thread.join()
|
|
|
|
assert failures == []
|
|
assert sandboxes["sandbox-a"].content == "ALPHA\nbeta\n"
|
|
assert sandboxes["sandbox-b"].content == "alpha\nBETA\n"
|
|
assert shared_state["overlap_detected"].is_set()
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_str_replace_and_append_on_same_path_should_preserve_both_updates(monkeypatch) -> None:
|
|
class SharedSandbox:
|
|
def __init__(self) -> None:
|
|
self.id = "sandbox-1"
|
|
self.content = "alpha\n"
|
|
self.state_lock = threading.Lock()
|
|
self.str_replace_has_snapshot = threading.Event()
|
|
self.append_finished = threading.Event()
|
|
|
|
def read_file(self, path: str) -> str:
|
|
with self.state_lock:
|
|
snapshot = self.content
|
|
self.str_replace_has_snapshot.set()
|
|
self.append_finished.wait(0.05)
|
|
return snapshot
|
|
|
|
def write_file(self, path: str, content: str, append: bool = False) -> None:
|
|
with self.state_lock:
|
|
if append:
|
|
self.content += content
|
|
self.append_finished.set()
|
|
else:
|
|
self.content = content
|
|
|
|
sandbox = SharedSandbox()
|
|
runtimes = [
|
|
SimpleNamespace(state={}, context={"thread_id": "thread-1"}, config={}),
|
|
SimpleNamespace(state={}, context={"thread_id": "thread-1"}, config={}),
|
|
]
|
|
failures: list[BaseException] = []
|
|
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_sandbox_initialized", lambda runtime: sandbox)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.ensure_thread_directories_exist", lambda runtime: None)
|
|
monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.sandbox.tools.is_local_sandbox", lambda runtime: False)
|
|
|
|
def replace_worker() -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
result = str_replace_tool.func(
|
|
runtime=runtimes[0],
|
|
description="替换旧内容",
|
|
path="/mnt/user-data/workspace/shared.txt",
|
|
old_str="alpha",
|
|
new_str="ALPHA",
|
|
)
|
|
assert result == "OK"
|
|
except BaseException as exc: # pragma: no cover - failure is asserted below
|
|
failures.append(exc)
|
|
|
|
def append_worker() -> None:
|
|
try:
|
|
sandbox.str_replace_has_snapshot.wait(0.05)
|
|
result = write_file_tool.func(
|
|
runtime=runtimes[1],
|
|
description="追加新内容",
|
|
path="/mnt/user-data/workspace/shared.txt",
|
|
content="tail\n",
|
|
append=True,
|
|
)
|
|
assert result == "OK"
|
|
except BaseException as exc: # pragma: no cover - failure is asserted below
|
|
failures.append(exc)
|
|
|
|
replace_thread = threading.Thread(target=replace_worker)
|
|
append_thread = threading.Thread(target=append_worker)
|
|
|
|
replace_thread.start()
|
|
append_thread.start()
|
|
replace_thread.join()
|
|
append_thread.join()
|
|
|
|
assert failures == []
|
|
assert sandbox.content == "ALPHA\ntail\n"
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_file_operation_lock_memory_cleanup() -> None:
|
|
"""Verify that released locks are eventually cleaned up by WeakValueDictionary.
|
|
|
|
This ensures that the sandbox component doesn't leak memory over time when
|
|
operating on many unique file paths.
|
|
"""
|
|
import gc
|
|
|
|
from deerflow.sandbox.file_operation_lock import _FILE_OPERATION_LOCKS, get_file_operation_lock
|
|
|
|
class MockSandbox:
|
|
id = "test_cleanup_sandbox"
|
|
|
|
test_path = "/tmp/deer-flow/memory_leak_test_file.txt"
|
|
lock_key = (MockSandbox.id, test_path)
|
|
|
|
# 确保测试开始前 key 不存在
|
|
assert lock_key not in _FILE_OPERATION_LOCKS
|
|
|
|
def _use_lock_and_release() -> None:
|
|
# Create and acquire the lock within this scope
|
|
lock = get_file_operation_lock(MockSandbox(), test_path)
|
|
with lock:
|
|
pass
|
|
# As soon as this function returns, the local 'lock' variable is destroyed.
|
|
# Its reference count goes to zero, triggering WeakValueDictionary cleanup.
|
|
|
|
_use_lock_and_release()
|
|
|
|
# Force a garbage collection to be absolutely sure
|
|
gc.collect()
|
|
|
|
# 检查特定 key 是否被清理(而不是检查总长度)
|
|
assert lock_key not in _FILE_OPERATION_LOCKS
|