DATA
6de0bf9f5b
Vendored deer-flow upstream (bytedance/deer-flow) plus prompt-injection hardening: - New deerflow.security package: content_delimiter, html_cleaner, sanitizer (8 layers — invisible chars, control chars, symbols, NFC, PUA, tag chars, horizontal whitespace collapse with newline/tab preservation, length cap) - New deerflow.community.searx package: web_search, web_fetch, image_search backed by a private SearX instance, every external string sanitized and wrapped in <<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>> delimiters - All native community web providers (ddg_search, tavily, exa, firecrawl, jina_ai, infoquest, image_search) replaced with hard-fail stubs that raise NativeWebToolDisabledError at import time, so a misconfigured tool.use path fails loud rather than silently falling back to unsanitized output - Native client back-doors (jina_client.py, infoquest_client.py) stubbed too - Native-tool tests quarantined under tests/_disabled_native/ (collect_ignore_glob via local conftest.py) - Sanitizer Layer 7 fix: only collapse horizontal whitespace, preserve newlines and tabs so list/table structure survives - Hardened runtime config.yaml references only the searx-backed tools - Factory overlay (backend/) kept in sync with deer-flow tree as a reference / source See HARDENING.md for the full audit trail and verification steps.
24 lines
1.2 KiB
Python
24 lines
1.2 KiB
Python
"""Built-in guardrail providers that ship with DeerFlow."""
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from deerflow.guardrails.provider import GuardrailDecision, GuardrailReason, GuardrailRequest
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class AllowlistProvider:
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"""Simple allowlist/denylist provider. No external dependencies."""
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name = "allowlist"
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def __init__(self, *, allowed_tools: list[str] | None = None, denied_tools: list[str] | None = None):
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self._allowed = set(allowed_tools) if allowed_tools else None
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self._denied = set(denied_tools) if denied_tools else set()
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def evaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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if self._allowed is not None and request.tool_name not in self._allowed:
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return GuardrailDecision(allow=False, reasons=[GuardrailReason(code="oap.tool_not_allowed", message=f"tool '{request.tool_name}' not in allowlist")])
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if request.tool_name in self._denied:
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return GuardrailDecision(allow=False, reasons=[GuardrailReason(code="oap.tool_not_allowed", message=f"tool '{request.tool_name}' is denied")])
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return GuardrailDecision(allow=True, reasons=[GuardrailReason(code="oap.allowed")])
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async def aevaluate(self, request: GuardrailRequest) -> GuardrailDecision:
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return self.evaluate(request)
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