Agents in this build are text-only researchers. Image, audio, video, and binary content has no role in the pipeline and only widens the attack surface (server-side image fetches, exfiltration via rendered img tags, etc). The cleanest answer is to never load it in the first place rather than maintain a domain allowlist that nobody can keep up to date. - web_fetch_tool now uses httpx.AsyncClient.stream and inspects the Content-Type header BEFORE the body is read into memory. Only text/*, application/json, application/xml, application/xhtml+xml, application/ld+json, application/atom+xml, application/rss+xml are accepted; everything else (image/*, audio/*, video/*, octet-stream, pdf, font, missing header, ...) is refused with a wrap_untrusted error reply. The body bytes never enter the process for refused responses. Read budget is bounded to ~4x max_chars regardless. - image_search_tool removed from deerflow.community.searx.tools (both the deer-flow runtime tree and the factory overlay). The function is gone, not stubbed — any tool.use referencing it will raise AttributeError at tool-loading time. - config.yaml: image_search tool entry removed; the example allowed_tools list updated to drop image_search. - HARDENING.md: new section 2.8 explains the policy and the frontend caveat (the LLM can still emit  markdown which the user's browser would render — that requires a separate frontend patch that is not yet implemented). Section 3.4 adds a verification snippet for the policy. The web_fetch entry in section 2.2 is updated to mention the streaming Content-Type gate. Both source trees stay in sync.
178 lines
6.9 KiB
Python
178 lines
6.9 KiB
Python
"""Hardened SearX web search and web fetch tools.
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Every external response is sanitized and wrapped in security delimiters
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before being returned to the LLM. See deerflow.security for the pipeline.
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Image fetching is intentionally NOT supported. Agents in this build are
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text-only researchers; image_search_tool was removed and web_fetch_tool
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refuses any response whose Content-Type is not a textual media type. If
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you need an image-aware agent, add a dedicated tool with explicit user
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review — do not lift these restrictions in place.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from urllib.parse import quote
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import httpx
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from langchain.tools import tool
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from deerflow.config import get_app_config
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from deerflow.security.content_delimiter import wrap_untrusted_content
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from deerflow.security.html_cleaner import extract_secure_text
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from deerflow.security.sanitizer import sanitizer
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DEFAULT_SEARX_URL = "http://localhost:8888"
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DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 30.0
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DEFAULT_USER_AGENT = "DeerFlow-Hardened/1.0 (+searx)"
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# Allowed Content-Type prefixes for web_fetch responses. Anything else
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# (image/*, audio/*, video/*, application/octet-stream, font/*, ...) is
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# rejected before its body is read into memory.
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ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPE_PREFIXES = (
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"text/",
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"application/json",
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"application/xml",
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"application/xhtml+xml",
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"application/ld+json",
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"application/atom+xml",
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"application/rss+xml",
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)
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def _is_text_content_type(header_value: str) -> bool:
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"""True if the Content-Type header is a textual media type we're willing to read."""
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if not header_value:
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# No header at all → refuse: we don't speculate.
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return False
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media = header_value.split(";", 1)[0].strip().lower()
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return any(media == prefix.rstrip("/") or media.startswith(prefix) for prefix in ALLOWED_CONTENT_TYPE_PREFIXES)
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def _tool_extra(name: str) -> dict:
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"""Read the model_extra dict for a tool config entry, defensively."""
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cfg = get_app_config().get_tool_config(name)
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if cfg is None:
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return {}
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return getattr(cfg, "model_extra", {}) or {}
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def _searx_url(tool_name: str = "web_search") -> str:
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return _tool_extra(tool_name).get("searx_url", DEFAULT_SEARX_URL)
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def _http_get(url: str, params: dict, timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) -> dict:
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"""GET a SearX endpoint and return parsed JSON. Raises on transport/HTTP error."""
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with httpx.Client(headers={"User-Agent": DEFAULT_USER_AGENT}) as client:
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response = client.get(url, params=params, timeout=timeout)
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response.raise_for_status()
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return response.json()
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@tool("web_search", parse_docstring=True)
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def web_search_tool(query: str, max_results: int = 10) -> str:
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"""Search the web via the private hardened SearX instance.
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All results are sanitized against prompt-injection vectors and
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wrapped in <<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>> markers.
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Args:
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query: Search keywords.
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max_results: Maximum results to return (capped by config).
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"""
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extra = _tool_extra("web_search")
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cap = int(extra.get("max_results", 10))
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searx_url = extra.get("searx_url", DEFAULT_SEARX_URL)
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limit = max(1, min(int(max_results), cap))
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try:
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data = _http_get(
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f"{searx_url}/search",
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{"q": quote(query), "format": "json"},
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)
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except Exception as exc:
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return wrap_untrusted_content({"error": f"Search failed: {exc}"})
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results = []
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for item in data.get("results", [])[:limit]:
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results.append(
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{
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"title": sanitizer.sanitize(item.get("title", ""), max_length=200),
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"url": item.get("url", ""),
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"content": sanitizer.sanitize(item.get("content", ""), max_length=500),
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}
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)
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return wrap_untrusted_content(
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{
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"query": query,
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"total_results": len(results),
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"results": results,
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}
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)
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@tool("web_fetch", parse_docstring=True)
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async def web_fetch_tool(url: str, max_chars: int = 10000) -> str:
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"""Fetch a web page and return sanitized visible text.
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Only textual responses are accepted (text/html, application/json, ...).
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Image, audio, video, and binary responses are refused before the body
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is read into memory — this build is text-only by policy.
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Dangerous HTML elements (script, style, iframe, form, ...) are stripped,
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invisible Unicode is removed, and the result is wrapped in security markers.
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Only call this for URLs returned by web_search or supplied directly by the
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user — do not invent URLs.
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Args:
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url: Absolute URL to fetch (must include scheme).
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max_chars: Maximum number of characters to return.
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"""
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extra = _tool_extra("web_fetch")
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cap = int(extra.get("max_chars", max_chars))
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limit = max(256, min(int(max_chars), cap))
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try:
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async with httpx.AsyncClient(
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headers={"User-Agent": DEFAULT_USER_AGENT},
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follow_redirects=True,
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) as client:
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# Stream so we can inspect headers BEFORE reading the body.
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# Refuses image/audio/video/binary responses without ever
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# touching their bytes.
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async with client.stream("GET", url, timeout=DEFAULT_TIMEOUT) as response:
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response.raise_for_status()
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content_type = response.headers.get("content-type", "")
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if not _is_text_content_type(content_type):
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return wrap_untrusted_content(
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{
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"error": "Refused: non-text response (this build does not fetch images, audio, video or binary content).",
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"url": url,
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"content_type": content_type or "<missing>",
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}
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)
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# Read at most ~4x the char limit in bytes to bound memory.
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# extract_secure_text + sanitizer will trim further.
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max_bytes = max(4096, limit * 4)
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buf = bytearray()
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async for chunk in response.aiter_bytes():
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buf.extend(chunk)
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if len(buf) >= max_bytes:
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break
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html = buf.decode(response.encoding or "utf-8", errors="replace")
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except Exception as exc:
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return wrap_untrusted_content({"error": f"Fetch failed: {exc}", "url": url})
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raw_text = extract_secure_text(html)
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clean_text = sanitizer.sanitize(raw_text, max_length=limit)
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return wrap_untrusted_content({"url": url, "content": clean_text})
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# image_search_tool was intentionally removed in this hardened build.
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# Agents are text-only researchers; image fetching has no business in the
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# pipeline and only widens the attack surface (data exfiltration via
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# rendered <img> tags, server-side image content, ...). If you need to
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# bring it back, build a separate tool with explicit user-side allowlist
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# and a render-side proxy — do not just paste the old function back.
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