# CLAUDE.md — orientation for future sessions

You are in **deerflow-factory**, a hardened deployment of
[bytedance/deer-flow](https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow) on data-nuc.
Read this file first before touching anything in this repo.

## Read these in order

1. **HARDENING.md** — threat model, what was changed, why, and how to
   verify. The full audit trail. Update it whenever you change anything
   listed in section 6 ("Files touched").
2. **RUN.md** — how to start/stop/inspect the stack, smoke-test commands.
3. **DEERFLOW_PROMPT_INJECTION_PROTECTION_PLAN.md** — the original plan
   that the hardening implements. Historical context.

## Layout

```
deerflow-factory/
├── deer-flow/                    ← vendored upstream (no nested .git!)
│   └── backend/packages/harness/deerflow/
│       ├── security/             ← hardened content sanitizer  (lives here!)
│       ├── community/searx/      ← hardened web tools           (lives here!)
│       └── community/<native>/   ← stubbed, raise on import
├── backend/                      ← factory overlay (mirror, kept in sync)
│   └── packages/harness/deerflow/
│       ├── security/             ← duplicated source-of-truth
│       └── community/searx/      ← duplicated source-of-truth
├── docker/
│   └── docker-compose.override.yaml  ← named bridge br-deerflow
├── scripts/
│   ├── deerflow-firewall.sh      ← egress firewall up/down/status
│   └── deerflow-firewall.nix     ← NixOS module (imported by /etc/nixos/configuration.nix)
├── config.yaml                    ← runtime config — only references searx tools
├── .env                           ← real secrets, .gitignored
├── .env.example                   ← template
├── HARDENING.md
├── RUN.md
└── CLAUDE.md                      ← you are here
```

## Hard rules (do not violate without explicit user approval)

1. **Native web tools stay disabled.** The legacy providers
   (`ddg_search`, `tavily`, `exa`, `firecrawl`, `jina_ai`, `infoquest`,
   `image_search`) and the matching helper clients (`jina_client.py`,
   `infoquest_client.py`) are intentionally replaced with import-time
   `RuntimeError` stubs. Re-enabling **any** of them requires:
   - hardening the call site (sanitize → wrap_untrusted_content)
   - moving the matching test out of `tests/_disabled_native/`
   - updating HARDENING.md sections 2.3, 2.4, and 6
   - explicit user sign-off in the same conversation

2. **All web output must be sanitized and delimited.** Any new code path
   that returns external data to the model **must** route through
   `deerflow.security.sanitizer.sanitize()` and
   `deerflow.security.content_delimiter.wrap_untrusted_content()`.
   The whole point of this build is that the LLM never sees raw web
   bytes.

3. **No secrets in git.** `.env` is `.gitignored`. Before staging,
   verify with `git diff --cached | grep -iE 'api_key|secret|token|password'`.
   Use `.env.example` for templates only — placeholders, never live keys.

4. **Two source trees, one truth.** The hardened code lives in **both**
   `deer-flow/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/{security,community/searx}/`
   (the runtime path) **and** `backend/packages/harness/deerflow/...`
   (the factory overlay used by the standalone tests). They must stay
   identical. If you fix a bug in one, mirror it to the other in the
   same commit, or delete one of the two trees and pick a single source
   of truth.

5. **The egress firewall is part of the threat model.** Do not change
   `scripts/deerflow-firewall.sh` allow/block lists without updating
   HARDENING.md section 2.7. Specifically:
   - allow: `10.67.67.1` (Searx), `10.67.67.2` (XTTS/Whisper/Ollama-local)
   - block: `192.168.3.0/24` (home LAN), `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`

6. **deer-flow is vendored, not a submodule.** The upstream `.git` was
   removed and is parked at `/tmp/deer-flow-upstream.git.bak` on
   data-nuc. If you need to pull upstream changes, do it in a separate
   working copy and rebase manually — do not re-introduce a nested git
   into this repo.

## Where things run

- **Host:** data-nuc (NixOS 25.11, kernel 6.12.x). `data` user is in
  the `docker` group, can use `docker compose` directly.
- **Repo path:** `/home/data/deerflow-factory`
- **Gitea remote:** `https://git.beerbandit.de/DATA/deerflow-factory`
  (credentials in `~/.git-credentials` for user `data`)
- **Egress firewall:** `systemctl status deerflow-firewall`
  - active = rules in DOCKER-USER, applied to `br-deerflow`
  - inactive = rules removed (no firewall)
- **DeerFlow stack:** not running yet at the time of this CLAUDE.md
  initial commit. First start: see RUN.md.

## Commit / push style

- Imperative subject, present-tense body. Reference HARDENING.md
  sections by number when you change something they describe.
- Do not amend or force-push without asking. Add a follow-up commit.
- Pre-commit secret check:
  ```bash
  git diff --cached --name-only | xargs -I{} grep -lE \
    'api_key|secret_key|sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}|ghp_|tvly-' {} 2>/dev/null
  ```
  Only `.env.example` should appear. If anything else does, abort.

## Quick verification (run before declaring "it works")

From `/home/data/deerflow-factory`:

```bash
PYTHONPATH=deer-flow/backend/packages/harness python3 -c "
# 1. hardened modules import
from deerflow.security.content_delimiter import wrap_untrusted_content
from deerflow.security.sanitizer import sanitizer
from deerflow.security.html_cleaner import extract_secure_text
import importlib.util
assert importlib.util.find_spec('deerflow.community.searx.tools') is not None

# 2. native modules fail closed
for prov in ['ddg_search','tavily','exa','firecrawl','jina_ai','infoquest','image_search']:
    try:
        __import__(f'deerflow.community.{prov}.tools')
        raise SystemExit(f'FAIL: {prov} imported')
    except RuntimeError as e:
        assert 'disabled in this hardened DeerFlow build' in str(e)
print('OK')
"

# 3. security tests
PYTHONPATH=deer-flow/backend/packages/harness pytest \
    backend/tests/test_security_sanitizer.py \
    backend/tests/test_security_html_cleaner.py -q
# expected: 8 passed

# 4. firewall service
systemctl is-active deerflow-firewall
sudo scripts/deerflow-firewall.sh status
```

If any of these fail and you cannot fix them in the same session, stop
and report — do not paper over the failure.

## Common footguns

- **`pip` is not installed system-wide on NixOS.** If you need a Python
  dep for a one-off script, use `nix-shell -p python3Packages.<name>`
  or run inside a deer-flow `.venv` once it exists. Do not try
  `pip install --user` — it will fail.
- **`sudo` is passwordless for `data`.** Be careful: any `sudo` you run
  succeeds without a prompt. Double-check destructive commands.
- **NixOS rewrites `/etc/systemd/system/`.** Do not drop unit files in
  there directly; they will be wiped on `nixos-rebuild switch`. Add a
  `systemd.services.<name>` block to a Nix module instead (see
  `scripts/deerflow-firewall.nix` for the pattern).
- **The factory overlay (`backend/`) is currently a mirror, not the
  runtime.** When you import from Python at runtime, the path that
  matters is `deer-flow/backend/packages/harness`. The overlay only
  matters for the standalone factory tests. Keep them in sync until we
  pick one as canonical.
- **`docker compose down` does not remove the firewall rules.** That is
  by design. Only `systemctl stop deerflow-firewall` removes them.

## What this repo is NOT

- Not a fork on GitHub. The vendored upstream `.git` was deleted on
  purpose. If you need to compare against upstream, clone it fresh into
  `/tmp/`.
- Not a Python package (yet). There is no `pyproject.toml` at the
  factory root; the Python entry point is the deer-flow tree's own
  `backend/pyproject.toml`. We only put files into its harness package.
- Not multi-tenant. There is exactly one DeerFlow instance, one Searx,
  one set of credentials. Keep it that way unless the user explicitly
  asks for tenancy.