Vendored deer-flow upstream (bytedance/deer-flow) plus prompt-injection
hardening:
- New deerflow.security package: content_delimiter, html_cleaner,
sanitizer (8 layers — invisible chars, control chars, symbols, NFC,
PUA, tag chars, horizontal whitespace collapse with newline/tab
preservation, length cap)
- New deerflow.community.searx package: web_search, web_fetch,
image_search backed by a private SearX instance, every external
string sanitized and wrapped in <<<EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT>>>
delimiters
- All native community web providers (ddg_search, tavily, exa,
firecrawl, jina_ai, infoquest, image_search) replaced with hard-fail
stubs that raise NativeWebToolDisabledError at import time, so a
misconfigured tool.use path fails loud rather than silently falling
back to unsanitized output
- Native client back-doors (jina_client.py, infoquest_client.py)
stubbed too
- Native-tool tests quarantined under tests/_disabled_native/
(collect_ignore_glob via local conftest.py)
- Sanitizer Layer 7 fix: only collapse horizontal whitespace, preserve
newlines and tabs so list/table structure survives
- Hardened runtime config.yaml references only the searx-backed tools
- Factory overlay (backend/) kept in sync with deer-flow tree as a
reference / source
See HARDENING.md for the full audit trail and verification steps.
